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Abstract 
Divergent thinking as a creative ability and perceptual switching between different 
interpretations of an unchanging stimulus (known as perceptual multistability) are 
thought to rely on similar processes. In the current study, we investigate to what 
extent task instructions and inherent stimulus characteristics influence partici-
pants' responses. In the first experiment, participants were asked to give as many 
interpretations for six images as possible. In the second experiment, participants 
reported which of two possible interpretations they saw at any moment for the 
same line drawings. From these two experiments, we extracted measures that al-
low us direct comparison between tasks. Results show that instructions have a 
large influence over the perception of images traditionally used in two different 
paradigms and that these images can be perceived in appropriate ways for both 
tasks. In addition, we suggest that the connection between the two phenomena can 
be explored interchangeably through three experimental manipulations: a) using 
a common set of images across both experiments, b) giving different task instruc-
tions for the two tasks, and c) extracting comparable metrics from both experi-
mental paradigms. 
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Introduction 
Every day people face situations for which new ways of seeing and thinking are nec-
essary or at least beneficial. How are they able to arrive at these novel interpreta-
tions? Here we explore two approaches to answer this question: investigating 
creative problem solving (novel ways of reaching a goal) and perceptual switching 
(different ways of interpreting the environment). We also investigate their connec-
tion through homogeneous measurements. 
Creative problem solving refers to the process of generating original and appropriate 
responses to reach a goal. The ability of divergent production (the generation of 
many possible solutions), which is instrumental to creative problem solving (see 
Guilford, 1967), can be assessed in numerous ways (Runco & Pritzker, 2011, p. 548). 
Generally, in divergent thinking tasks people are instructed to generate as many 
ideas as possible for visual or verbal stimuli. The number of generated distinct ideas 
provides a measurement of fluency or flexibility and is thought to reflect the ability 
to mentally restructure the stimulus. 
On the other hand, consider ambiguous images such as Jastrow's bistable duck–
rab ⁠bit (Jastrow, 1900, p. 295): people first perceive one of the interpretations, then 
after prolonged viewing the second interpretation is perceived, after which percep-
tion alternates between the two interpretations of “duck” and “rabbit” (Leopold & 
Logo⁠the⁠tis, 1999; Long & Toppino, 2004). The phenomenon of switching between 
alternative interpretations of ambiguous images is generally known as multistable 
perception, or as bistable perception if only two interpretations are possible 
(Leo⁠pold & Logothetis, 1999). Multistability is considered to involve restructuring 
the interpretations of the ambiguous stimulus at higher levels of cognitive processing 
(Long & Toppino, 2004; Sterzer & Kleinschmidt, 2007). 
Both divergent thinking and perceptual switching tasks attempt to measure the influ-
ence of perceptual and mental restructuring and are therefore thought to rely on sim-
ilar processes (Schooler & Melcher, 1995). Phenomenologically, switching between 
different representations in divergent thinking tasks and different interpretations of 
an ambiguous image have been described as similar human experiences since the early 
20th century by Gestalt theories (Duncker, 1963). Researchers interested in creative 
problem solving and multistability have been both hunting for and haunted by ambi-
guity for a long time. However, the commonalities between creative problem solving 
and perceptual switching have predominantly been observed anecdotally. Only a few 
studies have empirically investigated the relationship between the two phenomena. 
Wiseman, Watt, Gilhooly, and Georgiou (2011) provided empirical support for the 
connection between perceptual switching and divergent thinking or, in general, cre-
ative ability: participants who reported that they could switch more easily to the sec-
ond interpretation of the Jastrow duck–rabbit image also rated themselves as being 
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more artistically creative and better creative problem solvers. They also found a 
strong correlation between self-reported ease of perceptual switching and categori-
cal flexibility measured with a single item unusual uses task. Following up on these 
results, Doherty and Mair (2012) found that fluency for written responses measured 
with the Pattern Meanings task (Wallach & Kogan, 1965, p. 33) is positively corre-
lated with the number of switches in perceptual multistability tasks (duck–rabbit, 
vase–face, Necker cube). The authors speculated that the same executive control 
mechanisms may be involved in perceptual switching and divergent production, 
therefore the relationship is worth exploring further. 
The effect of ambiguous visual stimuli on divergent thinking was also investigated by 
Wu, Gu, and Zhang (2016) and Laukkonen and Tangen (2017). In both studies, am-
biguous and non-ambiguous images were presented before a creativity task (i.e., an 
alternative uses task or insight problem, respectively). The results of both studies 
showed that participants could generate a significantly higher number of solutions 
in the creativity task if they saw an ambiguous figure instead of an unambiguous im-
age. This was interpreted as evidence that ambiguous images facilitate creative ideas, 
possibly due to the fact that both involve resolving conflicting sensory input. 
The three studies by Wiseman et al. (2011), Wu et al. (2016), and Laukkonen and 
Tangen (2017) show that performance in creative problem solving and perceptual 
switching tasks are related and can even influence each other. However, it is hard to 
accommodate results across tasks and studies that use different measures of diver-
gent thinking and multistable perception. 
In this study, we took images regularly used in divergent thinking and bistable percep-
tion tasks and explored whether the way they were administered affected participants' 
performance. Specifically, we investigated whether the images from the two paradigms 
led to similar temporal measures when administered in divergent thinking and per-
ceptual switching conditions. To explore this hypothesis, we used images from a diver-
gent thinking task, namely the Pattern Meaning task by Wallach and Kogan (1965), and 
compared participants' task performance with ambiguous visual stimuli such as duck–
rabbit, mouse–man, donkey–seal, which are widely used in bistable research (see 
Wimmer, Doherty, & Collins, 2011). Finally, additional temporal measurements were 
extracted from the computerized divergent thinking and bistable perception tasks. 
With this study, we aim to investigate to what extent task instructions and inherent 
stimulus characteristics influence participants' responses. Specifically, we ask 
whether the connection between the two phenomena can be investigated inter-
changeably by observing three experimental manipulations: a) using a shared set of 
images in both tasks, b) giving different task instructions, and c) extracting compa-
rable metrics from both experimental paradigms. We also aim to contribute to the 
growing literature of empirical investigations of the relationship between divergent 
thinking and multistable perception. 
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In the first experiment, we explored whether images taken from bistable perception 
tasks, which are typically considered to have two interpretations, can trigger more 
interpretations, similarly to the images used in the divergent thinking tasks. There-
fore, we presented images from divergent thinking and perceptual switching tasks 
to a group of participants and asked them to generate as many interpretations as 
possible. This is a typical administration of a divergent thinking task in creativity re-
search, for example in Wallach and Kogan (1965). 
In the second experiment, participants were presented with the same set of images 
in a perceptual switching task. In this case, participants were asked for an initial in-
terpretation of one image, then shown two possible interpretations and later asked 
to continuously report their perception for 120 seconds. This is a setup typically em-
ployed in bistability experiments. We examined whether perceptual switching dy-
namics differed depending on the origin of the images. 
In addition, we explored ways of directly comparing results from the two experi-
ments. Besides the measurements which are normally used, we recorded the time 
participants took to generate the first answer in the divergent thinking experiment. 
This is similar to the concept of an initial reaction time, which is often used in the 
analysis of perceptual switching tasks, i.e., the time taken to report the first interpre-
tation by button press. An additional measurement was the first phase duration, 
which denotes the time it took participants to name their first solution in the diver-
gent thinking task and the time until they gave the first interpretation in the percep-
tual switching task. We were interested to see to what extent these two variables 
were similar for the same image between experiments. 
 
Experiment 1: Divergent Thinking 
 
Participants 
Six postgraduate students aged between 25 and 48 years (mean = 37.17, SD = 8.06) 
participated (self-reported gender: 1 female, 3 males, 2 unspecified). 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Six different images were used, three of them taken from the Pattern Meaning task 
by Wallach and Kogan (1965), and three frequently used in bistable perception tasks 
(see Figure 1). 
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The setup of the computerized task for each image consisted of the following three 
stages: “instruction,” “task,” and “break.” During the “instruction” stage, participants 
were told that they should give “as many answers as [they] can” for each of the stim-
uli and that there were no correct or incorrect answers. Each of the six images was 
presented for 120 seconds, during which time participants reported their interpre-
tations. This was followed by a self-paced “break.” 
For this exploratory study, fluency was chosen as one of the main measures as used 
in the Pattern Meaning task and other divergent thinking tasks because it can be 
scored objectively for any sample size. Participants’ verbal responses were recorded 
and later transcribed along with the start and end time of each answer. Fluency was 
extracted as the number of responses generated during the 120 seconds of the “task,” 
the initial reaction time (the response time 𝑡1 from the start of the task until a partic-
ipant gave the first answer) and the first phase duration (the time participants main-
tained their first interpretation). 
 
 
Figure 1. Images used in the two experiments; top row: duck–rabbit, man–
mouse, seal–donkey; center row: oven–people, street map–flag pole, spar-
kling magic wand–flower; bottom row: disambiguated image for oven, am-
biguous oven–people, disambiguated image for group of people. 
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Results 
Fluency as the number of generated ideas is summarized in Figure 2. All participants 
were able to produce two or more distinct interpretations for each stimulus. The av-
erage fluency per participant across all six tasks was between 4.17 and 8.33 and the 
initial answer was produced between 1.67 < 𝑡1 < 8.46 seconds after task start. The 
average fluency for images from divergent thinking tasks across all participants 
(mean = 6.50, SD = 2.31) was very similar to the average for images from perceptual 
switching tasks (mean = 6.44, SD = 3.17). 
 
Experiment 2: Perceptual Switching 
Participants 
Six participants (five females, one male), aged between 27 and 33 years (mean = 30.17, 
SD = 2.32) participated. 
Materials and Procedure 
The same six images used in Experiment 1 were presented in a computerized percep-
tual switching condition (see Figure 1). A sequence of stages was administered for each 
image: “initial interpretation,” “disambiguation,” “training,” “task,” and “break.” 
Figure 2. Number of solutions for each stimulus. The six stimuli are displayed 
on the x-axis and the number of solutions is displayed on the y-axis. Each of 
the boxes span from the first to the third quartile of the distribution of fluency; 
the thick line represents the median. 
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Initially, participants were asked to write down their “initial interpretation" of the im-
age. To disambiguate each line drawing from the Pattern Meaning task, the two most 
frequent interpretations from another study were visualized (see Figure 1). During 
the “disambiguation,” these were used to instruct participants which interpretations 
of the images they should report. For example, participants who saw the image at the 
bottom center of Figure 1 were instructed to switch between the “oven” (bottom left) 
and “people” (bottom right) interpretation. In the self-paced “training,” pressing one 
of the two defined keys on the computer keyboard showed the corresponding disam-
biguation on screen. During the 120 seconds of the “task,” the states of the two keys 
were recorded continuously. The start and end times for each button press served as 
the basis to calculate variables such as phase duration (the length of time during 
which one interpretation is sustained), first phase durations and initial reaction times. 
At the end of each sequence of stages, participants had self-paced “breaks.” 
 
Results 
The first phase durations for each stimulus are displayed in Figure 3. The two interpre-
tations were generally well balanced (Moreno-Bote, Shpiro, Rinzel, & Rubin, 2010) for 
all six images, suggesting that participants perceived equally the two interpretations 
for each image. This shows that perceptual switching can be experienced in response 
to images taken from divergent thinking tasks if participants are instructed to do so.  
 
Results: Shared Measures from Experiment 1 and 2 
Figure 3. The average phase duration for each interpretation of each stimu-
lus. The phase duration (in seconds) is displayed on the y-axis, while the in-
terpretations of the stimuli are displayed on the x-axis. 
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In addition to the separate analysis of the two experiments, we explored a direct ex-
perimental connection between divergent thinking and perceptual switching. For ex-
ample, we extracted the initial reaction time and the first phase durations for each 
image from both experiments. 
The initial reaction times of all participants for each of the six images is shown sepa-
rately for the two experiments in Figure 4. Comparing the same image across the two 
experiments seems to indicate that the instructions influenced the time it took par-
ticipants to generate an answer. Specifically, the initial reaction time in the divergent 
thinking tasks was generally shorter (median = 2.98 s) than in the perceptual switch-
ing task (median = 3.44 s), even though the data collected does not provide enough 
evidence to suggest a significant difference. Moreover, Figure 4 provides no indica-
tion that the initial reaction times for the three images taken from the Pattern Mean-
ing task are different from the images taken from the perceptual switching tasks. 
Nevertheless, Figure 4 seems to show that some images elicit a longer time until the 
first interpretation in both experiments (e.g., pole–street), while other images (e.g., 
oven–group of people) cause shorter reaction times in both experiments. 
 
 
Figure 4. Distributions of the initial reaction times for each of the six images, 
separately for the two experiments. 
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Figure 5 displays the first phase duration for each image across all participants and 
experiments. It also seems to indicate that the first phase duration for some images 
is short for both experiments (e.g., donkey–seal and duck–rabbit) while participants 
maintain the first interpretation for a longer time for line drawings (e.g., street map–
flag pole). Overall, the first phase duration for the divergent thinking task in Experi-
ment 1 is shorter (median = 1.71 s) than for the perceptual switching task in Experi-
ment 2 (median = 2.52 s). 
 
Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to explore the connection between divergent think-
ing and perceptual switching. To investigate this, we collected a set of images previ-
ously used in divergent thinking or perceptual switching tasks. We then observed to 
what extent this combined set of images can be used in each of the original tasks. 
Moreover, we aimed to investigate whether participants' responses could indicate 
whether the original source of the image had an impact on the results. This would 
allow us to identify whether, except for the instructions, there are inherent charac-
teristics that differentiate the two sources of images. 
In the first experiment, images taken from divergent thinking and perceptual switch-
ing paradigms were presented to participants as typically done in divergent thinking 
tasks, while in the second experiment the same images were presented as typically 
done in perceptual switching tasks. The influence of instructions in the two tasks can 
Figure 5. Distribution of the first phase duration for each of the six images, 
separately for the two experiments. 
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be observed, for example, when we compare the initial reaction times and first phase 
durations for the same image from the two experiments. For both measures the re-
sults showed that instructions lead to different results based on the two tasks that 
participants were instructed to complete. These results indicate that instructions 
play a significant role in the way different images are interpreted, a claim that is sup-
ported by previous research on the influence of instructions on divergent production 
(Runco, Illies, & Eisenman, 2005). The role of instructions for perceptual switching 
needs to be addressed more thoroughly by future research. 
In Experiment 1, we found that the number of solutions does not substantially differ 
depending on the source of the image. This suggests that images previously used in 
perceptual switching tasks can have more possible interpretations than usually as-
sumed for bistable perception—at least if instructions require this. 
The phase durations measured in Experiment 2 do not indicate a clear distinction 
between the source of the line drawings; i.e., perceptual switching dynamics cannot 
be used to distinguish between images taken from perceptual switching or divergent 
thinking tasks. This suggests that bistable perception can also occur to some extent 
in response to the images taken from the divergent thinking task. 
The number of participants in each experiment is small and no statistical inferences 
can be drawn. Nevertheless, trends indicate that there are individual differences 
across the selected images, independently of their original source. This result sup-
ports findings from bistable research showing that perceptual switching differs across 
images (see van Ee, van Dam, & Brouwer, 2005). For example, in Experiment 2 the 
first phase duration for image D2 (street map–flag pole, see Figure 5) is longer than 
for other images in the same experiment, suggesting that this image is processed dif-
ferently. Previous studies that examined the connection between creativity and per-
ceptual switching overlooked the role of different types of images (Doherty & Mair, 
2012; Laukkonen & Tangen, 2017; Wiseman et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2016). It is possible 
that the relation between perceptual switching and creativity is found only for some 
images. We suggest further exploration of the origin of these differences, as they might 
unveil common factors affecting the relationship between the two phenomena. 
One challenge in designing the perceptual switching task for Experiment 2 was to 
select images that were previously used in divergent thinking tasks and which could 
be disambiguated. Unlike the disambiguation of images from bistable research which 
had previously been shown to work, the disambiguation of the line drawings from 
Wallach and Kogan's Pattern Meaning task had not been used before. We selected 
the two most common answers from a previously recorded data set for three of the 
images from the Pattern Meaning task. Subsequently we used them to disambiguate 
the line drawings by adding lines (for an example, see Figure 1). The disambiguations 
from perceptual switching tasks, on the other hand, consist of slight changes to the 
position and shape of key elements of the original image. The current results do not 
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allow us to draw any conclusions about whether the interpretations we selected for 
the disambiguation were the easiest to switch between, or whether other interpre-
tations would have worked better. Feedback provided by some participants sug-
gested that they could differentiate between the two types of images based on the 
way they were disambiguated. Participants described this difference in terms of dif-
ficulty to actively imagine additional features for images taken from the divergent 
thinking task, while for the images from perceptual switching tasks this was easier. 
Further differences between the two sets of images are that the images from the Pat-
tern Meaning task are more abstract and are based only on a few geometric shapes 
such as circles, lines and squares. On the other hand, the images from the perceptual 
switching tasks can be described as more complex and organic and are supposed to 
depict real objects (Strüber & Stadler, 1999). Different reaction times to abstract line 
drawings can be explained by the greater difficulty in processing these images as 
compared to content-based depictions of real-world objects. This highlights the im-
portance of the top-down effects of imagery and memory on the perception of im-
ages, as previously summarized in Scocchia, Valsecchi, and Triesch (2014). 
Another limitation of the study comes from the inability to control for participants’ 
prior exposure to the images. Bistable stimuli are well-known images that are often 
referenced in arts and popular culture and participants could have known some of 
them. Therefore, individual prior exposure to these images might have influenced 
the responses in both experiments. For instance, most of the participants reported 
knowing the duck–rabbit image beforehand. This might have biased their responses 
in the divergent thinking condition, particularly if they attempted to overcome the 
initial fixation on the two known interpretations. Previous experience with the im-
ages might also have shortened the time of the first perceptual switch in Experi-
ment 2. Future studies should seek to eliminate the effect of stimuli familiarity, which 
can affect participants’ responses. 
 
Conclusion 
The present study shows that inherent stimuli characteristics and instructions play an 
important role in interpreting ambiguous images. Participants respond to images from 
divergent thinking and perceptual switching tasks according to the instructions. Spe-
cifically, participants are able to provide more than two unique solutions when in-
structed to do so, even for images that are typically considered to have only two 
interpretations. Similarly, they can be instructed to switch back and forth between two 
given interpretations for images that are considered to have several possible interpre-
tations. In addition, shared metrics can be extracted from both paradigms which would 
allow researchers a more direct comparison between the two phenomena. 
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